Here is a list of problems I work on. Under each heading, I’ve included links to my main works on that problem.
This book contains a sustained argument for the idea that, contrary to what most thinkers in philosophy and the cognitive sciences believe, it actually is possible for one person to directly experience the mind of another. This implies that the mind lacks the sort of deep metaphysical privacy attributed to it, and behaves like any physical thing would.
This has consequences for the traditional mind-body problem, in that it opens the way to understanding the mind as a physical entity, and mental states and processes as physical states and processes.
Capgras syndrome and misidentification
This 2010 paper contains my general account of Capgras syndrome, along with the other misidentification disorders, including Cotard syndrome, and Fregoli syndrome. The central idea is that our brains contain representations of the external features of people who we know, their faces, bodies, and voices, but we also represent their psychological features, including their beliefs, desires, and characteristic emotions. These “internal” representations are damaged or mentally inaccessible to the person with Capgras syndrome, causing the appearance of an unfamiliar mind inside a familiar body.
This book contains a description of the executive theory of responsibility, according to which the presence or absence of the right sorts of executive processing are necessary before a person is responsible for crimes or other wrongs.
This book contains my two-factor account of confabulation.